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REVIEW ESSAY 
The Modem Construction of Myth. By Andrew von Hendy. 
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2002. Pp. 400. he. $39.95. 0-253-33996-0. 
REVIEWED BY ERWIN COOK 
The Modern Construction of Myth, by Andrew von Hendy, is an interdisciplinary survey of the construction of myth in the late eighteenth and nineteenth cen­turies. The author's thesis is that modern theories of myth can be divided into 
three broad groups, folkloristic, ideological, and constitutive, and that they all derive 
from an original, romantic, construct. The survey is organized diachronically, with some 
attention to taxonomy and axiology. I find the author's thesis entirely persuasive: what 
follows is meant to serve as a guide to the overall argument and additionally to highlight 
various important threads that remain somewhat diffuse in a book of this scope. 
In brief, the author argues that romantic authors created the category of myth to desig­
nate narrative that provides insight into transcendental truths, communicated in sym­
bols whose irreducibility makes them an inexhaustible source of meaning. In the first 
three chapters, von Hendy charts the development of this view: renaissance belief that 
myth is a form of moral instruction is discredited by early romantic authors, who 
increasingly accept myth on its own terms as a product of the savage mind, and as the 
expression of unmediated religious experience, particularly of nature. To illustrate, von 
Hendy contrasts Bacon, who follows ancient tradition in treating myth as allegory, with 
Fontenelle, whose progressive model of human history leads him to treat myth as the 
irrational speculation of primitives endeavoring to explain the world about them. Von 
Hendy finds this shift of perspective so radical and definitive of subsequent theorization 
of myth as to justify the claim that the modern understanding of myth originates in the 
romantic era. 
Vico shares Fontenelle's historical assumptions, but draws from them the revolutionary 
inference that since culture itself is a product of the human mind, the evolution of cul­
ture must itself mirror the evolution of human consciousness: "in more current diction, 
consciousness itself turns out to be historically conditioned; assumptions about a uni­
versal human nature must be reconsidered" (9). And although men of the first age were 
irrational primitives, they were also poets of unmatched imaginative power: their expe-
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rience of the world was unmediated by knowledge, reason, and abstract thought, and 
they communicated that experience in "imaginative universals" (as opposed to "intelli­
gible universals;• or simple abstractions drawn from particulars). Vico's concept of the 
imaginative universal thus anticipates the later romantic "symbol" in which signifier is 
united with the signified, and, still more astonishing, it has a pronounced affective 
dimension: "in its ambition to unite cognitive generalities with affective particularities it 
is the initial registration of [a problematic] that will come to seem endemic to modern 
theories of myth" (11 ). Myth itself is identified as a symbolic mode of cultural construc­
tion belonging to the first stage of a stadia I meta history leading from the Age of Gods 
to that of Heroes and finally of Men. No serious student of mythology will be unaware 
of the central role played by Vi co in modern theories of myth, but the juxtapositions von 
Hendy creates between these various seventeenth- to nineteenth-century authors, and 
their contextualization in the romantic movement, are most welcome and illuminating. 
Several enduring trends in theorizing myth emerge already at this early date. The degen­
erative model of human history inherited by Bacon is replaced by a progressive model 
that aligns myth with "primitive" thought. The development of abstract modes of 
thought diminished the immediacy of human experience and with it our mythopoeic fac­
ulty: whereas for Vico this loss was compensated for by the rise of culture and its emol­
uments, for early romantic poets such as Schiller, Wordsworth, and Holderlin, the loss 
was painful, creating nostalgia for an unmediated experience of nature, a world before 
the mechanistic worldview, the "entgotterte Natur;· bequeathed to man by Newtonian 
physics. But even as these romantic authors mourn the dissociation of sensibility and 
the lost unity of Vico's first man, others affirm humankind's mythopoeic power as ongo­
ing and universal. ChapterTwo is devoted to the role these authors play in the construc­
tion of myth. Blake and Nova lis, for example, construct allegorical accounts of how mod­
ern man may overcome the dissociation of sensibility that are themselves demonstra­
tions of that power. For these authors, myth is the means of restoring coherency and 
unity to Western culture, and they see their demonstration that mythopoeia is a univer­
sal human faculty as legitimizing modernity. They also play an important role in the 
process of psychologizing the hero by internalizing the quest romance. 
In the latter half of the eighteenth century, Heyne and Herder helped popularize the term 
"myth" and frame its romantic meaning (discussion of the two should have been further 
developed, especially as von Hendy refers to Herder's views in passing). Herder's belief 
that myth is a religious response to nature finds echoes in the poetry of Schiller, 
Holderlin, and Wordsworth (and is treated as a given a century later by Ruskin). At the 
turn of the century, Schlegel, in Dialogue on Poetry, has Schelling argue that modern 
poetry is inferior to ancient because "we have no mythology" representing a unified sys-
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tem of belief (a point he has in common with Herder and Schiller). His solution is in effect 
an endorsement of Blake and Navalis's project: that is, the answer to having no mythol­
ogy is to create one. Schlegel's view that mythopoeia is a universal human faculty is fun­
damental to numerous subsequent theories of myth. 
Schiller adopts the use of "symbol" in the sense of Kant's "aesthetic idea;• and is soon 
followed by Schelling, Schlegel, and Goethe. Symbol and myth are both seen as taute­
gorical, "a self-referential category that eludes exhaustive allegorical explanation" (36). 
Over time, the meaning of symbol is transformed from that of a tautegorical mode of 
communication to one that is "miraculous" -that is, the symbol participates in transcen­
dent religious reality. This is the view taken by Coleridge, Creuzer, and Schelling himself, 
and it becomes canonical in the later nineteenth century. Whereas Schlegel has Schelling 
blur the distinction between myth and poetry, Schelling himself conflates symbol and 
myth. Creuzer, on the other hand, confronts the fundamental distinction between the 
immediacy of the symbol and the temporal dimension of narrative and ends up demot­
ing myth to secondary status vis-a-vis the symbol. Each of these conceptual moves has 
an enduring legacy among twentieth-century theorists. 
Schelling contributes two additional tenets to the romantic construction of myth that 
remain influential in the twentieth century: 1) myth "belongs to an unconscious, teleo­
logical process" that stands outside time and history, and 2) as in Vico, humans create 
their own social world and myth is constitutive of it (39). While Schelling accepts the 
enlightenment view that human consciousness has evolved from savagery to scientific 
rationalism, he does not accept the view of Vi co and Schiller that such progress entails 
a loss of creative imagination. Instead he sees consciousness as evolving in stages along 
a circular or spiral path that will one day reconstitute the dissociated sensibilities 
mourned by Schiller. 
In Chapter Three, von Hendy charts two divergent and often opposed trends in nine­
teenth-century attitudes towards myth. Among literary authors and artists, myth is 
increasingly seen as a means of achieving transcendence. During this same period, how­
ever, Marx, Nietzsche, and the Brothers Grimm laid the groundwork for post-romantic 
theories that reject this view. The path that von Hendy here takes from Hegel to Marx via 
D. F. Strauss and Feuerbach is a familiar one, but his larger thesis again allows von 
Hendy to present the material in an interesting light: von Hendy zeroes in on Hegel's 
argument that "belief;' a sum of social practices driven by prejudice, superstition, and 
other errors, constitutes a tissue of "false consciousness:• Hegel's view that history is 
structured by a struggle between enlightenment and false consciousness is fundamen­
tal to subsequent dialectical approaches to myth. 
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D. F. Strauss, who accepts the view that myth reflects a society's Weltbild, relegates 
"myth" to the status of false consciousness and thereby explicitly historicizes it as 
belonging to an early phase in humanity's progress to true religion. In response to Hegel 
and Strauss, Feuerbach argues that all theology and with it attempts to imagine divinity 
are simple projections. Marx, in turn, applied Feuerbach's arguments on the nature of 
religion to the study of material culture in order to unmask its underlying "ideology;' 
which thus corresponds to Hegel's false consciousness. Marx, however, criticizes 
Feuerbach for treating the "human essence" as an abstraction situated in the individual, 
arguing instead that it is the ensemble of social relationships within a given culture. 
Carlyle shares the romantic view that myth can restore unity to modern culture, and he 
affirms our ability to attain transcendental knowledge. Symbols are viewed as the means 
by which humanity constructs its social worlds, while myth constitutes religious symbol­
ism and is a communal product that in turn produces cultural cohesion. Thus histori­
cized, Carlyle reaches the conclusion that myths and symbols can "die" with the cultures 
that produce them. He also historicizes the hero with a devolutionary model of myth in 
which the hero begins as divinity, but is transformed over time in a series of displaced 
avatars of which the last is the hero as king. Versions of this model will be taken up by 
subsequent authors of a historicizing bent, such as Frye. 
The Brothers Grimm helped popularize an ethnographic approach to myth that posed a 
more immediate challenge to romantic theory. The Grimms treat myth seriously as a dis­
tinct genre of narrative that at once is bound by and informs the culture that produces 
it. They also introduce the modern distinction between myth, legend, and fairytale. This 
taxonomy, with its implicit historical model in which myth degenerates over time to the 
status of mere tale, is a recurrent feature of subsequent theorizing on myth, especially 
among anthropologists. Von Hendy might have noted that these categories have no 
basis in ancient taxonomy (on Boas's findings, see below). 
Von Hendy next briefly treats Tennyson and Wagner, who are said to produce "parables 
of myth" (64) and to share the belief of Carlyle and Grimm that myths promote cultural 
cohesion. Ruskin and George Eliot, on the other hand, hold that "myth offers private 
access to religious inspiration" and to eternal verities (67; my emphasis). In Eliot's 
Middlemarch "we encounter a suggestion that people may actually embody mytholog­
ical archetypes, and in Daniel Deronda that 'myth' operates within us at an unconscious 
level" (68). Von Hendy concludes with a discussion of Nietzsche, whose early forays into 
the ritual origins of Greek tragedy in ecstatic choral performance were a formative influ­
ence on the myth and ritual school. In his later work, Nietzsche is said to treat myth as a 
socially constructed, and necessary, illusion, a "vital lie" that can be extended to under­
stand all cultural constructions (74). 
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In Chapter Four, von Hendy shows how in academic circles the transcendentalist view of 
myth loses out to anthropological approaches in the latter nineteenth century. Myth is 
increasingly viewed as the sacred narrative of primitive societies, remote in either time 
or place. Thus, although they reject romantic transcendentalism, these early anthropol­
ogists maintain the link between myth and religious experience. Von Hendy begins with 
Muller's theory of myth as cognitive failure, which is shown to be regressive in many 
respects, above all in treating ancient mythology as having degenerated from an origi­
nal monotheism. This degeneration is a consequence of linguistic errors-for example, 
of taking metaphors literally. 
Von Hendy next turns to the cognitively based theories of Comte, Tylor, and Spencer. 
Comte argues that human consciousness progresses through three "states" of develop­
ment: theological, metaphysical, and scientific (following in metahistorical traditions as 
old as Vico and Schelling). The theological phase is in turn divided into fetishism, poly­
theism (itself having three phases), and monotheism. Comte sees myth as originating in 
polytheism, and perhaps not even in its earliest phase, so that myth is developmentally 
late and a secondary rationalization. Since Comte believed that ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny, mythopoeia becomes a property of the savage and childish mind. Romantic 
belief that artists too have mythopoeic ability can now be explained as a case of arrest­
ed development. 
Tylor and Spencer share Comte's view on the lateness of myth and on its status as reli­
gious narrative. Tylor adapts Comte's tripartite model of religious development by sub­
suming fetishism and polytheism under the rubric of animism, which is in turn followed 
by monotheism. Myth, located in this animistic stage, is again mental error, as in Muller, 
though the causes of such error are much broader and myth does not degenerate over 
time, but instead mirrors the evolution of human thought. His belief in pre-linguistic 
"material" myth again raises the issue of the relationship between myth and narrative, 
and he follows the romantics and Comte in holding that myth originates in personifica­
tions of nature. Tylor, who introduces the "hero" to anthropological discourse, situates 
the hero in his historical framework, concluding that similarities in the heroes of world 
mythology reveal universal mental laws governing the imaginative process.Tylor is also 
remarkable for the emphasis he places on myth in his anthropology, an emphasis that 
proved highly influential in the future course of the discipline. 
In the last quarter of the century, myth is increasingly understood in affective terms. 
W. R. Smith is identified as a transitional figure who treats myth as cognitive and reli­
gion as affective, the latter consisting not of a system of beliefs but of ritual action by the 
group. Myth is again viewed as a secondary rationalization, of little value in the study of 
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religion. Smith thus lays the cornerstone to the " ritual theory of myth": whereas roman­
tics understand myth in terms of symbol, anthropological approaches link it to ritual. 
Von Hendy next seeks to explain the far-reaching cultural impact of Frazer's Golden 
Bough, a work whose shortcomings were immediately recognized by the scholarly com­
munity. Von Hendy argues that part of the work's attraction came from its sprawling 
dimensions and its promise of uniting an enormous body of diverse material under the 
aegis of a ubiquitous fertility religion with its dying god (a promise T. S. Eliot did much 
to promote). A further attraction of the Golden Bough, especially among creative writ­
ers, is a darker undercurrent suggesting that beneath the thin skin of civilization we are 
all savages. Under the influence ofTylor, Smith, and Mannhardt, Frazer assumes that the 
human mental processes remain identical across time and cultures, and on this basis he 
expands Muller's comparative method to link myths based on simple analogy. By 1900, 
he had also adaptedTylor's tripartite historical model as: magic, religion, science. He fol­
lows Comte, Spencer, and Smith in viewing myth as a secondary aspect of religion, 
which he understands as a system of belief. 
From the ridiculous to the sublime: Durkheim was inspired to investigate the origins 
and nature of religion by Smith, whose influence is evident above all in his approach to 
religion as group behavior, and his identification of religious with social institutions. 
The key for Durkheim is to isolate the source of the intellectual "categories" on which 
understanding is based. As opposed to the idealistic view that these categories are 
innate, Durkheim argues that they are based on "collective representations" which a 
given culture extrapolates from its own social structures. Myth is a religious mode of 
collective representation, usually connected with religious rite, to which it supplies the 
etiology (98). It follows that myth is a system of classification, a taxonomy, though 
Durkheim excludes it as an item of sociological study because, like Comte, he sees it as 
late and secondary, and because it has a complex evolution that must be approached 
by other means. He also follows Comte in stressing the role of religion in providing 
social cohesion. Numerous subsequent theorists of myth rewrite Durkheim in emotive 
terms. 
The first individual to do so was Durkheim's friend Lucien Levy-Bruhl, who in his later 
work treats collective representations as powerfully "expressive conceptualizations of 
the sacred" (103). He subscribes to Durkheim's view of myth as secondary and late, but 
as a collective representation he finds that it too is loaded with affect. For Levy-Bruhl, 
myth mediates between the intangible supernatural world and quotidian sensory expe­
rience. The actual performance of a myth, together with its contents, also serves to rein­
force social cohesion. 
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The Cambridge Ritualists also theorize myth in emotive terms. Like Frazer, they met with 
immediate and damning criticism, but exercised enormous influence on contemporary 
writers. The basis of their approach is that, as in Comte, ritual is primary and myth a sec­
ondary rationalization. In Themis, however, Jane Harrison gives myth enhanced stand­
ing as simply an alternative mode of expression: ritual expresses emotion through 
action, myth through words. Myth, then, does not originate in order to explain, though 
it may become etiological if the corresponding rite is lost. Like Levy-Bruhl, Harrison thus 
takes Durkheim's intellectualist theory of primitive religion and recasts it in emotive 
terms-in her case under the acknowledged influence of Nietzsche's vitalism-so that 
religion unites the community in its celebration. 
In Chapters Five through Eight, the emphasis shifts from diachronic history to taxono­
my, as von Hendy surveys the resurgence of romantic thought among modernist 
authors and popularizers in the early twentieth century. This resurgence was fueled by 
the contemporary shift from cognitive to affective approaches to myth, and a correspon­
ding shift from the search for origins to that of structure. Chapter Five is devoted to the 
role of depth psychology. Romantic influence on the approaches to myth by Freud, Jung, 
and their disciples is evident in their concept of the "symbol;' and their belief in 
mythopoeia as a universal human faculty. Jung also adopts romantic transcendental 
assumptions, but Freud does not and he cannot therefore be considered neo-romantic. 
Freud's own investigations into the psychological roots of literature led him to treat all 
imaginative activity, including myth, as analogous to dream consciousness. Myth thus 
becomes disguised wish fulfillment, a cultural fantasy of displaced libidinal desire that 
remains constant across cultures and millennia, and is also simultaneously the fantasy 
of the individual. Such analysis relies heavily on a universalizing of the human psyche 
and on a relatively fixed symbolism. 
For Freud's disciple 0. Rank, hero myth is informed by the libidinal development of boys: 
hero myth thus becomes a psychological adventure story in which the hero represents 
the ego. In striking continuation of the path taken by Blake and Nova lis, depth psychol­
ogy thus helped domesticate and interiorize the hero and his quest by treating him as 
the product of a universal human fantasy. Behind this lies a Lamarckian belief. shared by 
Freud, that psychological states such as Oedipal guilt are biologically inherited. 
Jung and his followers loom rather larger in this narrative than I am accustomed to see­
ing, though there is no denying their impact, particularly among creative writers. Jung 
develops a theory of cultural origins in a spiritualized libido that is not reducible to sex­
ual drives, although cultural taboos cause the libido to become creative. The libido is 
viewed as a benign, dynamic force that transforms animal into higher urges and all sym­
bols can be reduced to it. Jung accounts for the universality of the symbol, a term he 
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takes directly from Creuzer, with his theory of a collective unconscious containing arche­
types that are the basis of culturally mediated symbols and myths. While for Freud, myth 
disguises unconscious urges in symbolic form, Jung holds that symbols mediate 
between consciousness and the unconscious, "their function being to convert libido 
from a 'lower' into a 'higher' form" (131 ). Jung also sees hero myth as structured by the 
process of libidinal development: the hero is now the subject of a quest romance in 
search of his adult identity. Myth remains the sacred narrative of primitive society, but it 
is also a universal mode of thought accessible to the modern imaginative faculty, and its 
cultivation a key to mental health. 
Chapter Six shows how modernist authors such as Yeats, Lawrence, and T. S. Eliot pop­
ularize assumptions about the nature of myth so successfully as to spark a revival of the­
orization. Affective theory in anthropology and depth psychology emboldened these 
authors to assert that myth can provide an immediate experience of our racial past. Myth 
is thus affirmed as expressing eternal truths and as the vehicle of our escape from 
modernity by offering access to a timeless mystery religion. The attempt of these early 
modernists to regain a lost unity of sensibility thus continues in the tradition of Blake 
and Novalis. Yeats and Lawrence not only subscribe to romantic transcendentalist 
assumptions about myth but also to their spiral historical patterns and to their belief that 
mythopoeia is a universal human faculty that can restore cultural coherency. Joyce by 
this reading emerges as a model for postmodern approaches to myth, with his recogni­
tion of the self-consciousness of modern myth making. He thus subverts the views of his 
fellow modernists: his practice is ultimately ironic, and modern mythopoeia is exposed 
as simply another form of intertextuality. 
Chapters Seven and Eight survey the rise of mid-twentieth-century neo-romantic theo­
ries stimulated by the anthropologists, psychologists, and literary authors discussed in 
the previous chapters. Chapter Seven treats authors interested in the "linguistic, episte­
mological, and aesthetic implications of a universal mythopoeic faculty" (154). Cassirer 
is inspired by the work of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl to use myth and religion to chart the 
evolution of human consciousness (I would have welcomed a more systematic engage­
ment with Schelling's influence here). Cassirer distinguishes among various symbolic 
modes of thought that originate in, and to various degrees remain permeated by, a fur­
ther category of "mythic;· itself affirmed as a permanent feature of human conscious­
ness. For Cassirer, all thought is symbolic, though he does not use the term in its roman­
tic sense, but rather as designating signs within a semiotic system: their function is to 
mediate our experience of reality which we can no longer confront directly. He thus 
denies the symbol its transcendental value but affirms its affective dimension, thus 
returning us to a problem as old as Vico. All symbolic thought, in turn, serves to objec-
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tify: myth objectifies feelings, specifically of life as a unity, and does not distinguish 
between appearance and reality. The affective dimension of mythical thought leads 
Cassirer to argue that myth includes an original action and emotive experience as well 
as narrative, which is viewed as a secondary mediation: "we encounter once again this 
fundamental stumbling block of romantic speculation" (156). At the same time, "Cas­
sirer's message that mythical thought is enmeshed in the symbolic form of the artist's 
work constitutes an important mediation between nineteenth-century romanticism and 
mid-twentieth-century theorists of a New Critical bent" (160). On these foundations, he 
develops an Hegelian inspired model of the history of religion in which mythic thought 
gradually achieves self-awareness as a symbolic mode with an affective core. Through­
out much of his career, Cassirer's view of mythic thought is thus benign. In his final work, 
however, written in the aftermath of National Socialism, Cassirer acknowledges the dan­
ger of myth's affectivity: Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl's image of a people united in the 
ecstatic dance of their religion is reconfigured so that myth becomes a totalitarian men­
tality, a beast waiting in the shadows. 
Urban adopts Cassirer's semiotic concept of the "symbol" and similarly distinguishes 
among various symbolic modes, of which poetry, instead of myth, stands opposed to 
science. Myth is itself the narrative expression of religious emotion, an encounter with 
what Otto famously termed the "mysterium tremendum;• but it can also be viewed as 
analogical thought generally and as inherent in all language. He thus exposes "what 
turns out to be in the twentieth century a significant split between ' myth' in the relative­
ly narrow generic sense and 'the mythical' as the fictive aspect of all our mental con­
structions" (163). 
Wheelwright develops an opposition between expressive and referential language, in 
which science is again opposed to myth along with poetry and religion. In the course of 
his career,. he seeks to reconcile his view of myth as the narrative of primitive cultures 
and, following Cassirer, as a primary mode of thought. He accomplishes this by treating 
myth as a two-stage process in which a "mythoid" stage of awareness motivates a nar­
rative rationalization of-especially religious-experience. His analysis owes much to 
Cassirer and Frye and is significant chiefly as a first attempt at a fully semantic approach 
to myth. Von Hendy also finds that Urban and Wheelwright leave open the possibility 
that myth is simple self-projection, thus anticipating "constructive" theory. 
Frye combines Frazer and Freud in a unified theory of literature based on myth, viewed 
as the union of ritual, which supplies the narrative, with dream (i.e., libidinal fear and 
desire), which supplies the thematic content. Behind this fusion of anthropology with 
depth psychology stands a synthesis of romantic speculation centered on deriving liter­
ature from myth and religion that also owes a good deal to Blake, from whom Frye 
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derives his theory of literary symbolism. For Frye, as for Freud and Rank, the hero rep­
resents the ego, and he continues Carlyle's project of charting the evolution of the hero 
through Western literature, which he does in terms of the hero's democratization and 
psychologization. Frye thus posits five stages in the hero's development, in the first of 
which the hero is a god and the narrative a myth. He thus endorses Cassirer's meta his­
tory but views that as ultimately cyclical, as in Schelling. But Frye also posits five phas­
es in the evolution of the symbol, of which the fourth is the concrete universal of roman­
tic theory, and it is within this matrix that he locates the creation of myths uniting dream 
and ritual. Von Hendy observes that these different conceptions of myth are never rec­
onciled in Frye's work. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Frye is completely aware of 
the traditions in which he is operating, and his work is generally much more coherent as 
a result. 
Chapter Eight is devoted to mid-century popularizers such as Eliade, Neumann, Graves, 
and Campbell, whose theoretical justification for assigning a place to myth in modern 
life continues the romantic project of a Yeats or Lawrence. Although they base their 
analyses on ethnology and psychology, these authors seem no longer aware of the 
larger intellectual tradition in which they operate. Eliade insists that whenever humans 
experience the sacred through ritual and myth "they enter the timelessness of the orig­
inal event" (194). Myth is a narrative of creation that invests a culture with its values, 
beliefs, and rituals (a commonplace since Malinowski). For Eliade, this allows us to 
escape modernity, which he views with romantic jaundice, and Jungian psychology is 
an important tool in that escape. His concept of the symbol is taken directly from Jung, 
who as we have seen takes it from the romantics. Neumann, on the other hand, com­
bines the Jungian model of libidinal development with a Hegelian inspired history of 
the evolution of consciousness. Myth is thereby viewed as the phenomenology of a 
teleological process. 
Lord Raglan treats hero and god as interchangeable concepts: the hero is a god in ritu­
al, and the god a hero in myth. The hero's reduced mythological status reflects romanti­
cally inspired notions of a decline explicit in Raglan's theory that when it becomes 
detached from ritual, heroic myth degenerates into saga and folktale in a series of 
"increasingly 'displaced' analogues of the plot and characters of the sacred original" 
(193). Raglan remains influential among theorists who seek to derive literature from 
myth and ritual: assertions, such as that romance is disguised myth, attest to his influ­
ence on Frye. Although Raglan scorned psychological approaches to myth, his justly 
famous diagnosis of a transcultural narrative pattern underlying hero-myth is broadly 
compatible with such approaches (and in fact significantly overlaps the one outlined by 
Rank). Raglan's findings would thus seem to support Tyler's view that heroic myth 
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reveals universal mental laws. He also observes that hero-myth commonly centers on 
liminal moments, concluding that hero myth develops out of commonly experienced 
rites of passage in early societies. 
Robert Graves likewise belongs to the ritualist school. Graves argues that an early fertil­
ity religion centered on a mother-goddess has survived into modernity in disguised 
form. This goddess is the Moon, or the Muse, and myths honoring her are narrated in a 
magical, poetic language. He is thus working in the tradition of Frazer, whose work he 
sought to improve upon and supplant. 
Like Neumann, Joseph Campbell takes a Jungian approach to hero myth, though he 
focuses on the latter half of the hero's career, while Neumann focuses on the first. And, 
like Neumann and Frazer, he seeks to disclose the "universal forms" of world mytholo­
gy. The goal of this synthesis is to recover knowledge of Jung's "universal will;' the 
acquisition of which defines Campbell's hero. Campbell's hero myth is based on Jung's 
model of youthful libidinal development, and he proposes a stadia I history of the evolu­
tion of the hero reminiscent of Carlyle. 
Chapter Nine returns us to the early years of the twentieth century and the rise of mod­
ern social anthropology based on systematic fieldwork. Von Hendy argues that thinkers 
of a positivist and pragmatic orientation belonging to Anglophone traditions of anthro­
pology-in whose number he notably includes Levi-Strauss-achieved the most signifi­
cant progress on theorizing myth during this period. These early social anthropologists 
take from Durkheim the view that cultural phenomena must be understood as an inte­
grated system; hence there is a need for a method that can "isolate and analyze the func­
tioning of the variables" (203). Whereas Durkheim himself had little to say about myth, 
these later functionalists re-introduce it into the matrix of social functions in preliterate 
societies. Conversely, they introduce cultural context into the interpretive matrix of 
myth. By demonstrating the significance of that context they severely undermine the 
transcendentalist theories surveyed in the previous chapters. 
Functionalism in a sense begins with Malinowski. Not since Tylor has myth been so 
prominent an aspect of anthropology, and Malinowski's contribution is a theory of myth 
as "functional, pragmatic, and affective" that has dominated British anthropology since 
(204). For Malinowski, performance context tells us as much about the meaning of the 
myth as the actual narrative. Myth itself is not simply sacred narrative but lived reality: 
indeed, it is this shared psychological response to its performance that distinguishes 
myth from other types of narrative (he continues to follow Grimmian taxonomy). 
Without such fieldwork, then, all theories about the nature and uses of myth remain 
speculative. Malinowski concludes that the job of myth is to codify a society's system 
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of belief, values, and rites. It does so by resurrecting primeval reality and allowing the 
community to live in the presence of the gods who created it. 
Contemporary scholars usually distance themselves from Malinowski's later emphasis 
on biological determinism and individual psychology in favor of Radcliffe-Brown's con­
ception of the social function of myth. Like Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown sees myth and 
ritual as affectively charged reinforcements of social values and cohesion, but he 
believes that the native story tellers and audiences of myth are unaware of its actual 
function. His legacy to British cultural anthropology is in fact a relative devaluing of myth 
as a tool in understanding oral cultures. 
Von Hendy notes that Boas's distaste for "speculation" makes him an unlikely candidate 
as an important theorizer of myth. Nevertheless, Boas recognizes the importance of 
traditional narrative in oral societies, and through diligent observation refutes several 
nineteenth-century preconceptions about myth. Specifically, myth is not a response to 
natural phenomena (a view he and Malinowski share based on their fieldwork). Nor does 
it "degenerate" into folktale, and is not distinguished from folktale as "sacred narrative;' 
but solely in that it describes events before humans became distinct from other animals. 
Even so, no sharp line can be drawn between them, and there is little place in Boas's tax­
onomy for "legend": the Grimms' tripartite schema thus collapses into two overlapping 
categories of tale. Still more important is Boas's finding that any given myth is a brico­
lage of pre-existing story fragments that have been ideologically elaborated for the pur­
poses of social legitimization. As such, it is inherently no more stable than the social sys­
tem that produces it. Nevertheless Boas accepts Wundt's distinction between narrative 
and mythical concepts, "a recurrent theme in the problematic of myth ever since 
Creuzer;' although he allows "for a more conservative element in tales that undergo ide­
ological elaboration" (220). 
A second counter-trend response to the emergence of nee-romanticism is the subject of 
Chapter Ten, in which von Hendy traces the career and influence of Levi-Strauss. Levi­
Strauss's work is described as an eclectic mix of French, specifically Durkheimian, soci­
ology, structural linguistics, and American anthropology. Von Hendy focuses on the 
anthropological angle so as to provide a relatively fresh perspective on some extreme­
ly well-worn material, though his dismissal of structural linguistics makes this a chapter 
for the initiated. Von Hendy's major contribution here is in allowing us to see more plain­
ly than in any other survey the degree and manner in which Levi-Strauss can be seen as 
responding to and building on the work of Boas and his disciples. For example, he 
accepts Boas's diffusionist model, and goes on to provide an explanation of why myths 
can either "die" or be reinvigorated by crossing cultural borders. And, like Boas, he 
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argues that without a wealth of ethnographic comparanda it is impossible to understand 
a culture's myths. 
Levi-Strauss's notorious declaration that myth is able to communicate its structural mes­
sage in even the worst translation is taken to imply that its messages transcend "any 
verbal function" (232). He is thus seen as confronting the central issue in Creuzer, and as 
adopting his solution. His innovation consists of asserting that myth conveys its mean­
ing through the individual units of action, represented as simple sentences. But myth 
also transcends narrative in the sense that its message is not derived from the diachron­
ic sequence of events, but from a synchronic system of relations organized by analogy 
and polarity. As a consequence, the meaning of myth eludes its audience as completely 
as in Radcliffe-Brown. Levi-Strauss thus shares with the depth-psychologists the belief 
that myth is an unconscious process that communicates its messages in code, though 
the nature of the coding is different. By providing a model designed to overcome logical 
contradictions in a culture's beliefs through progressive mediation, it serves a pragmat­
ic function, as in Malinowski, but that function is cognitive rather than affective, as in 
Tylor. He also provides an ingenious reformulation of the degenerative paradigms that 
litter modern theories of myth, according to which myth "degenerates" into literature by 
a progressive weakening of its oppositions, the final and most degenerate being the 
modern novel. Levi-Strauss thus gives us a theory of myth that does not patronize "sav­
age thought" but treats it as highly sophisticated. The chapter concludes with a survey 
of criticisms and modifications of Levi-Strauss, along with a general retreat from "grand 
theory:· 
Whereas Chapters Nine and Ten structurally detach Levi-Strauss from French scholar­
ship, using Dumezil to introduce Chapter Eleven detaches the school of Vernant and 
Detienne from Levi-Strauss. In this case, however, the resulting juxtapositions fail to illu­
minate-though the individual analyses remain of high quality-leaving us with a group 
of authors united only by topic and with very different approaches that von Hendy some­
times strains to connect. Dumezil is identified as the father of modern comparative 
mythology with his combination of historical linguistics, following in the tradition of 
Muller, and a Durkheim-inspired theory of myth based on social structure. As in Muller, 
myth is said to degenerate over time, albeit from an original trifunctional ideology, as 
opposed to theology, so that the gods of myth become the heroes of epic (more discus­
sion of recent challenges to Dumezil would have been helpful here). 
Burkert is credited with reinvigorating the "myth and ritual school" by basing it on dif­
ferent premises than his predecessors. In one of the more lurid moves in the book, von 
Hendy then uses Girard to illuminate the intellectual currents that inform Burkert (with 
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the result that he overstates the triangulation with Lorenz). License to do this is provided 
by Burkert's own remark that Girard and the school of Vernant and Detienne had helped 
revive interest in the role of sacrifice in ancient religion. But with Girard's Freudian­
inspired explanation of the origins of sacrifice Burkert has nothing in common, and 
though he dutifully cites "the Parisians" when they treat identical themes, his French col­
leagues are less inclined to return the favor because they do not see their approaches as 
compatible. 
Burkert's own contributions to the theorization of myth include establishing, more con­
vincingly than any other ritualist, the priority of ritual to myth: ritual behavior precedes 
the human species, while myth is not only linguistic-a disputed point, as we have seen 
-but unknown to us before the invention of writing. Their different origins do not, how­
ever, preclude them from growing together to achieve a "symbiosis:• Burkert also pro­
vides what von Hendy notes has become the "gold standard" among Classicists as a 
definition of myth: "the specific character of myth seems to lie neither in the structure 
nor in the content of a tale, but in the use to which it is put . . .  myth is a traditional tale 
with secondary, partial reference to something of collective importance" (269; quoting 
Burkert). 
Von Hendy introduces what he terms the "Paris School" by noting that whereas Burkert 
traces sacrificial ritual from its putative origins in the Paleolithic, Vernant, Detienne, and 
their followers investigate Greek myth and ritual as part of an integrated cultural system: 
their approach is thus temporally narrower and culturally more inclusive, and their goal 
is to disclose the collective representations that characterize ancient Greek thought. 
Whereas myth thus belongs to, and following Levi-Strauss must be studied in terms 
of, this broader cultural system, myth and the gods of myth comprise their own interre­
lated systems and cannot be understood in isolation. The project of a Frazer or Graves 
is thus doubly damned. In its place, the school of Vernant and Detienne opens a per­
spective on the structures of Greek thought that is at once extremely rich and deeply 
unfamiliar. 
ChapterTwelve returns us to the troika of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. Von Hendy notes 
a fundamental transvaluation of Marx's concept of ideology under turn-of-the-century 
affective theories, so that ideology increasingly comes to be seen as unconscious and its 
meaning broadened to include the entire superstructure. A consequence is what von 
Hendy terms a "mythward drift of ideology;· myth being now understood simply as false 
belief (280). We are thus dealing with an abrupt shift in the material under investigation, 
partially masked by a common term, that could have been better sign-posted and justi­
fied. Some appeal to Plato is surely called for, and von Hendy could have used 
Horkheimer and Adorno's ideological reading of the Odyssey to show that whereas ide-
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ological approaches tend to focus on the modern world, and to include non-narrative 
material such as photographs, they can also be applied to traditional stories. 
Sorel, however, points to an important cross-current in these larger trends with his own 
positive view of myth as a group of mental images able to evoke an emotional response 
of such power as to inspire revolution. As von Hendy notes, the legacy of the romantic 
symbol, together with Creuzer's valorization of image over narrative, is clear. Whereas 
for Sorel "myth" is opposed to ideology, Mannheim treats myth as enforcing it. 
Althusser, moreover, very nearly conflates myth and ideology in his Lacanian inspired 
revaluation of Marxism that treats ideology as a "normally unconscious, affective, and 
universal" (289) mode of production used in the construction of culture. Myth, in turn, is 
identified as the narrative of ideology. If myth becomes virtually another word for ideol­
ogy, then the proper task of the "mythologist" becomes unmasking its message. Most 
explicit in this regard is Barthes, whose theory of myth is a version of Adorno's negative 
dialectic: for Barthes, myth belongs to a semiological system that serves to "naturalize" 
and "universalize" bourgeois culture. Heidegger laid important groundwork for this 
approach by drawing out of Nietzsche-von Hendy speaks rather of finding it there-an 
antinomy between humanity's need to believe in life-enhancing lies and the need for an 
iconoclast to destroy them whenever they harden into idols. This amounts to an affec­
tive reformulation of Hegel's history of consciousness as the human struggle between 
our contradictory desires to live in the comfort of false consciousness and to achieve 
self-understanding. 
Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment defines the terms of this struggle 
as being between enlightenment and myth, thus gesturing respectively to Hegel's faith 
in rationalism and to Nietzsche's alleged nihilism. As with Barthes, their objective is a 
systematic unmasking of the myths of bourgeois culture. They treat political ideology as 
a subset of the broader concept of myth, though the later Adorno actually conflates the 
terms. They agree with Mannheim in viewing myth as coercive, embodying cultural 
assumptions that produce a fatalistic outlook. Von Hendy finds that Derrida's "concep­
tion of myth as metaphor abused by metaphysics is especially close to Adorno's notion 
of it as rigidified identity-thinking" (300). Derrida is also seen as making an important if 
indirect contribution to the construction of myth through the effect of his work on 
romantically inspired claims about the possibility of achieving transcendence. 
ChapterThirteen is devoted to philosophers and poets whose "constitutive" approach 
views myth positively as the means by which humans construct their social realities. The 
most influential member of this group is Paul Ricoeur, who combines hermeneutics with 
the phenomenology of Heidegger and the Christian existentialists. In his early work, 
Ricoeur adopts the romantic categories of the transcendental symbol and myth. He 
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departs from the romantics, however, in his innovative view of symbols as always medi­
ated by language and narrative, or myth, which serve to render them intelligible. Myth 
is thus the narrative of the symbol: it serves to "rationalize the gulf revealed by symbol 
between signifier and transcendental signified" (311 ). He soon concludes, however, that 
there is not one but two hermeneutics, the second being the "hermeneutics of suspi­
cion" championed by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, and he places them in a dialectical 
relationship rather than treating them as exclusive. Underlying his approach is the belief 
that the sacred is immanent in language, but that symbols are capable of hardening into 
religious idolatry: by smashing the idols, the iconoclast allows the symbols to speak 
once more. Von Hendy concludes by demonstrating how very closely Ricoeur's later 
work on metaphor and narrative cohere with his work on symbol and myth. 
Like Ricoeur, Kolakowski's early work originates in contemporary phenomenology and 
existentialism (although Kolakowski's existentialists are Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, in 
addition to Heidegger). For Kolakowski, myth allows us to accept the contingency of real­
ity by endowing the world with value. Myth is thus an indispensable aspect of human 
thought, and its influence can be wholly beneficent, as Kolakowski sees it as being in tra­
ditional cultures, though in modern societies it may also become a narcotic if it devel­
ops into ideology. We are thus once again in permanent need of a hermeneutics of sus­
picion, which Kolakowski identifies with the skeptical empiricism of a David Hume. 
Although his theory of myth is not based on theological assumptions, it still remains 
anchored in an external reality that includes Heidegger's Dasein. 
Eric Gould is said to provide the first entirely non-transcendental theory of myth as 
supreme fiction. Gould revives the romantic claim that modern authors such as 
Lawrence, T. S. Eliot, and Joyce are no less able to create myth-what he terms "mythic­
ity" than the storytellers of traditional societies. Gould seeks to validate the romantic 
equation of myth and literature with a phenomenological hermeneutics that draws on 
structuralist and poststructuralist critiques of both (319). Von Hendy's principal objection 
to the theory concerns his attempt to reconcile Levi-Strauss's and Barthe's very different 
approaches to "myth" and then apply them to his own. A more positive criticism con­
cerns Gould's narrow definition of mythicity as filling with signs of the numinous an exis­
tential gap between event and meaning. Instead, von Hendy proposes, mythicity can be 
viewed more broadly as the "motive for the fictions that constitute the entire production 
of human culture" (320). The resulting definition of mythicity is so broad as to be a gen­
eral theory of "necessary fiction:' 
Blumenberg offers a very different justification of the romantic belief mythopoeia is an 
enduring human faculty. For him, "the work of myth" is to interpose itself between 
humanity and our fear of the unknown. To accomplish its task, myth names to make 
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identifiable, employs metaphor to make familiar, and creates narrative to make accessi­
ble and explicable. It divides, limits, and confines the uncanny into a system of con­
traries. Myth is thus a response to existential Angst and a means of self-defense, com­
parable to the role Freud assigns to religion. If this is the work of myth, then "work on 
myth" commences already at the stage of naming, so that myth accomplishes its task 
while being worked upon. 
For Blumenberg, what makes myths endure is their Priignanz, an imprinted form at the 
core of all their variations, itself the sum product of what met with success during oral 
performances across the centuries. A result of this process is that myth is drained of the 
affect in which it originates, so that it very nearly approaches an objective status that 
helps explain its continued appeal. Myths with a high degree of Priignanz naturally invite 
further "work on" them that produces new versions, but if a particular version gains 
widespread currency it can become "dogma" that threatens to bring myth to an end (cp. 
Ricouer's "idolatry"). Von Hendy criticizes the model on the grounds that it "requires the 
essentializing of universal experience" and would still seem to require some version of 
the Lamarckian hypothesis so that the affective response of numerous people can be 
seen as more objective than that of an individual (323). Blumenberg's demonstration 
that the social prestige of a myth naturally invites more "work on" it could be used, how­
ever, to argue that in the modern world such work is nothing more mysterious than inter­
textual allusion (though why restrict this important insight to modernity?). 
Like Ricoeur, Adams believes that theories of the symbol must be based on linguistics, 
while avoiding Saussure's positivism. Adams seeks to derive a coherent theory of the 
symbol from Vico, Herder, and von Humboldt-and corroborated in the poetry of Blake 
and Yeats-that treats language as constituting reality. Otherwise, he argues, we are left 
with a theory of rhetoric. Myth is the product of symbolic thought and gives expression 
to all cultural fictions, itself seen as the result of humanity's innate need to invest the 
world with meaning. His dialectic is thus the mirror opposite of Horkheimer and 
Adorno's dark struggle between enlightenment and myth; and as in Blake and Yeats it 
does not admit of Hegelian synthesis, but is an infinite series of generative contraries. 
Although he affirms the romantic alignment of allegory with the positivist mentality of 
modern science, he refutes the romantic opposition between it and symbol and argues 
instead that the true contrary to both is the "secular symbolic:• His reason is that treat­
ing the symbol as somehow embodying the numinous signified causes it to revert nat­
urally to allegory. The secular symbol, by contrast, is seen as constitutive of cultural fic­
tion. "Adams's theory is thus far the most systematic and detailed account available 
among those thinkers who view myth as the permanent fiction-making aspect of human 
thought" (332). 
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Von Hendy concludes by anticipating a problem that began for me with his discussion 
of Marx, namely that his diachronic approach is less successful in the latter two-thirds of 
the book. It also leads to occasional distortions: a casual reader might well conclude, for 
example, that Marx and Nietzsche were actively engaged in theorizing myth, as opposed 
to laying the groundwork for two of the most serious challenges to romantic theory in 
the following century. Von Hendy furthers the potential for misunderstanding with sec­
tion titles such as: "Marx and Engels: 'Myth' as Ideology;· perhaps in an unconscious 
attempt to anchor the discussion in his overall framework. His discussion is also very 
much influenced by later "work on" these authors, which they might well have served 
to introduce in a less rigidly diachronic survey. That said, I would have sorely missed the 
juxtaposition of Marx with Carlyle. Chapter Eleven, on the other hand, should be split up 
and the section on Vernant and Detienne reassigned to its rightful place following Levi­
Strauss. Lord Raglan should also be rescued from his current company in Chapter Eight 
and he and Burkert placed after Jane Harrison (perhaps with some discussion of A. 
Brelich). 
Von Hendy again anticipates an objection I will not be alone in having when he treats 
folkloristic approaches-it is indicative of our differences here that von Hendy prefers 
the term "folkloristic" while I prefer "anthropological" -as an offshoot of romantic the­
ory: his defense is that had it not been for Jacob Grimm and Max Muller, myth might 
never have found its way into social anthropology. It seems to me, however, that this 
confuses an historical accident with the intellectual traditions on which modern anthro­
pological approaches to myth are based. Nevertheless, von Hendy's focus remains 
squarely on the individual authors and historical development as opposed to taxonomy, 
which seems to be primarily a hermeneutic convenience. 
A third complaint, more serious than the other two, but understandable in the light of 
the author's thesis, is that linguistics is underrepresented in a book on the modern con­
struction of myth. I consider it unfair, for example, to dismiss structuralist appeals to 
Saussure's linguistics as a "forced analogy" and wonder whether this is not simply a tac­
tic designed to obviate discussion. The historical linguists come in for similar criticism 
and neglect. A more generous appraisal of Muller, for example, might have better 
explained his lasting impact on the discipline. Jan Puhvel is mentioned but once in pass­
ing, and no mention at all is made of the groundbreaking work of Calvert Watkins and 
Gregory Nagy. Semiotics is also underrepresented: Pierce needs a better introduction in 
order to explain Lizska, and Calame's important applications of Greimasian semiotics to 
the study of Greek mythology surely deserves more than a single reference to one of his 
articles in a footnote. 
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It is also unfortunate that von Hendy limits his readership by assuming fluency in 
German and by employing critical terms and concepts that will be out of reach of many. 
Indeed, von Hendy makes few concessions to his readers-an important exception 
being his regular and helpful summary passages-and the conversation sometimes gets 
weighed down by amassing detail that, while interesting in itself, may cause the reader 
to lose sight of the book's argument. Finally, the production of the book is uneven: there 
are a number of omissions and mistakes in the index which often makes it difficult and 
time consuming to track down the cross-references required to follow von Hendy's argu­
ment. There are also a number of typographical errors, especially in the German cita­
tions, and capitalization of German nouns is more or less random. The bibliography is 
likewise uneven in citing the first editions of works, something I find especially regret­
table in a diachronic survey of scholarship. I also wished that von Hendy had cited the 
years of the initial publications more consistently in his discussion. I hope that these 
minor problems can be cleared up in a second, paperback, edition of the book that would 
then be within the reach of students as a seminar text (the division of the book into thir­
teen evenly spaced chapters makes it seem suspiciously as if it was designed for just this 
purpose). In the end, though, none of these issues affect what von Hendy has accom­
plished. For The Modern Construction of Myth is by some distance the most learned and 
ambitious history of theorizing myth ever read by this reviewer. Overall, the analyses of 
individual authors are of very high quality, and some are simply brilliant. It belongs on 
the bookshelf of any scholar interested in the modern history of myth or romantic liter­
ature, and it will prove invaluable to a good many others in the fields of philosophy, 
anthropology, and religion. I have personally learned a great deal from it about authors 
I thought I knew well, and about the history of a discipline in which I have long been pro­
fessionally active. 
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